International agreements · governance · policy
A working reference to the law of outer space — the five United Nations treaties and the Artemis Accords — built for agencies, policymakers and operators who need the framework clear, navigable and concrete.
How the framework was built
Space law grew in two waves: five binding UN treaties negotiated in the Cold War (1967–1979), then — after four decades of silence — a non-binding framework of political commitments for the new era of lunar activity. Click any milestone.
The core instruments
Each card opens a full profile: what it establishes, its key provisions, its status, and a concrete, current example of it at work.
By the numbers
Ratification tells you how much consensus an instrument really commands. The Outer Space Treaty is near-universal; the Moon Agreement was effectively rejected by every major spacefaring nation. The Artemis Accords (a non-binding framework, shown in a different colour) are catching up fast.
Approximate counts as of early 2026. The Artemis Accords measure signatories, not treaty ratifications — the categories are not strictly comparable, but the contrast in adoption is the point.
The participation map
A snapshot of where major space actors stand across the instruments. Hover any cell for the detail. Note the pattern: universal agreement on the foundations, divergence on the Moon Agreement and the Accords.
Indicative status as of early 2026. The Artemis Accords list keeps growing; China and Russia instead lead the separate International Lunar Research Station (ILRS) initiative. On a narrow screen, scroll the table sideways to see every column.
A tool you can use
The 1972 Liability Convention sets two different standards depending on where the damage happened. Pick the scenario to see which one governs — and how it played out in the only claim ever formally pursued under the Convention.
Where did a space object cause the damage?
Choose a scenario above to see the applicable standard.
The constitution of space
Nearly every later rule traces back to one of these articles. Tap an article to read it in plain language.
The modern layer
Opened in 2020, the Accords are not a treaty but a set of shared political commitments that translate the Outer Space Treaty into operational rules for lunar and deep-space activity. Expand each principle below.
Can you mine the Moon? The instruments give two answers, and this is the live fault line in space policy. Both positions are presented below.
The OST bars claiming territory (Article II), but says nothing explicit about extracted resources. On this reading, taking and using resources is lawful — like fishing in international waters — and national laws (US 2015, Luxembourg 2017, UAE, Japan 2021) plus the Accords simply provide certainty. Supporters argue this unlocks investment and is consistent with the OST.
The 1979 Moon Agreement calls lunar resources the common heritage of mankind, to be governed by an international regime sharing benefits. Critics argue that a US-led framework and unilateral national laws pre-empt the multilateral consensus the OST envisaged, and that "safety zones" risk becoming de-facto territorial claims.
A separate track exists: China and Russia lead the International Lunar Research Station, drawing its own coalition. The Moon's legal order is being shaped by practice, not a new treaty.
The wider regime
Hard-law treaties are only the skeleton. Day-to-day space governance also runs on UN soft law, national legislation, spectrum coordination, and sustainability guidelines.
Five non-binding sets adopted by the General Assembly — on legal principles, broadcasting, remote sensing, nuclear power sources, and benefits to developing states — fill gaps the treaties leave open.
Treaties bind states; states bind operators. Domestic licensing regimes (e.g. US, France, Luxembourg, UAE, Japan) implement OST Article VI's duty to authorise and supervise — and increasingly grant space-resource rights.
The ITU coordinates the radio frequencies and orbital slots every satellite needs. No spectrum, no mission.
Non-binding but widely followed: the IADC mitigation guidelines, the UN 2007 Debris Mitigation Guidelines, and the 2019 COPUOS Long-Term Sustainability Guidelines.
Destructive anti-satellite tests (China 2007, India 2019, Russia 2021) scatter long-lived debris, straining OST Article IX's "due regard". A growing group of states now back a moratorium on destructive direct-ascent ASAT tests.
The UN Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, served by UNOOSA, is where consensus space rules are negotiated. It works by consensus, which makes new binding treaties slow — and soft law attractive.
Quick reference